Learning outcomes
By the end of this lesson you should be able to: define consent and distinguish expressed, implied, informed and proxy consent, and say why blanket consent is rejected; state the elements of negligence and the standard of care against which a doctor is judged; distinguish an error of judgment from negligence, and civil from criminal liability; describe the place of medical records in the defence of a claim; state the exceptions to confidentiality and their limits; and describe how consent and confidentiality are handled for minors and for patients who lack capacity.
Prerequisites
Lessons 1 and 6. You need the medico-legal duties, the certificate practice and the consent sequence of the living-patient examination, which this lesson turns into a doctrine.
The big idea
Consent is where the doctor's authority over a patient's body legally begins and ends. A battery committed with good intentions is still a battery: the clinical outcome cannot retrospectively license a procedure the patient never permitted. The doctrine has two halves — the giving of information and the taking of agreement — and both must be recorded, because years later the dispute is never about what the doctor remembers explaining.
Types of consent
| Type | How given | Validity |
|---|---|---|
| Implied consent | By conduct — the patient offers his arm for an injection, presents for dressing | Sufficient for routine, low-risk care only; it cannot cover a risky or invasive procedure |
| Expressed consent | Orally or in writing, for a procedure or a course of treatment | Written for anything invasive; the form records the explanation, and is only as good as the discussion behind it |
| Informed consent | Disclosure of the nature of the treatment, its material risks and benefits, the alternatives and the consequences of refusal | The general standard; a consent taken without disclosure is a signature without a substance |
| Proxy consent | By a parent, guardian or nominated representative for one who lacks capacity | Governed by the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 for patients with mental illness; strictly required for a child |
| Blanket consent | A general authorisation for 'any procedure the doctors think fit' | Rejected by the courts: consent must be procedure-specific, because the patient's right is to decide about his own body |
NoteSamira Kohli versus Dr Prabha Manchanda (2008) is the Indian authority most often cited: a consent for one operation cannot be stretched to another, and a consent for diagnostic surgery cannot become consent for a different therapeutic procedure. Consent is not a licence for whatever the surgeon finds convenient.
Capacity is the gate. The patient must be able to understand the information, retain it long enough to decide, weigh it in the balance, and communicate the decision. Intoxication, delirium, dementia and psychiatric disturbance impair it, but no diagnosis automatically removes it — capacity is assessed for the specific decision, at the specific time, and where it is absent the Mental Healthcare Act's route, with a nominated representative, is followed.
Emergencies, minors and refusals
In a genuine emergency where delay to obtain consent would endanger life, treatment proceeds without it — the law recognises an implied consent to save a life, and the record must show the emergency, the reason consent was not obtained and what was done. That exception is narrow and it is not a convenience: it ends when the patient can be informed and asked, and it never authorises non-emergency procedures performed while the surgeon is already inside.
For a child, the consent of the parent or guardian is taken, but a mature minor's own agreement is sought and recorded; for a pregnant minor or a survivor of sexual assault who is below eighteen, the special statutes — the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act and POCSO — control, and the child's own consent for her care is taken with the statutory reporting. An adult with capacity may refuse treatment, even a life-saving treatment, and the refusal is legal and must be documented with the explanation given; the court, not the doctor, weighs a refusal that would end a life.
Negligence: the doctrine
| Element | Content | Illustration |
|---|---|---|
| Duty | A doctor-patient relationship exists, or the doctor has assumed care of the patient | A casual bystander has no duty; a doctor who attends a casualty does |
| Breach of duty | The care given fell below the standard of a reasonably competent practitioner in that specialty, with the same resources | This is the Bolam standard; reasonableness of the practice adopted is itself examined |
| Damage | The breach caused harm that the law recognises | An injury follows; the claim is for the injury, not for the breach alone |
| Causation | The damage resulted from the breach, not from the underlying disease or another cause | The court asks what would have happened had competent care been given |
NoteRes ipsa loquitur — the thing speaks for itself — applies where the event could not have occurred without negligence: a swab or instrument left in the abdomen, amputation of the wrong limb, a transfusion of mismatched blood. In those cases the burden shifts to the doctor to explain.
An error of judgment is not negligence. The law accepts that reasonable doctors differ, and a treatment adopted by a responsible body of professional opinion is not negligent merely because it failed or because another school would have done differently. Negligence lies where the practice adopted is one that no reasonable body of the profession would defend, or where the doctor failed to do what any doctor would have done — examine, monitor, refer, warn. Jacob Mathew versus State of Punjab (2005) is the Indian authority for the criminal version: liability for a doctor in a criminal case requires a degree of negligence amounting to gross negligence or moral turpitude, not mere want of care.
Three fora, three consequences
| Forum | What it decides | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Civil — courts and consumer commissions | Whether negligence caused damage, and what compensation is due; a doctor's service is a service under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 | Compensation; no ceiling fixed in law for the quantum |
| Criminal | Whether the conduct amounts to an offence — for example causing death by negligence under section 106 BNS (formerly section 304A of the Indian Penal Code), or assault where consent was absent | Imprisonment and fine, on proof beyond reasonable doubt |
| Professional | Whether there was misconduct under the professional conduct regulations, before the State Medical Council or the NMC Ethics Board | Censure, temporary removal from the register, or permanent erasure |
Indian Medical Association versus V P Shantha (1995) is the anchor for the civil liability of doctors as service providers: a patient who pays for care is a consumer, and deficiency in service is actionable. The decision produced years of claims, and with them the practical wisdom that now governs the hospital side of medicine: take consent, document, escalate, and refer rather than attempt what is beyond the available resources.
Records and confidentiality
Records are the doctor's defence and the patient's property in the sense that he is entitled to a copy of his own notes, within a reasonable time of the request. The record must be contemporaneous, timed, signed and complete: entries added later are marked as later and dated, never overwritten. In a negligence claim, the absence of a record is treated as the absence of care — a court will not infer an examination that was never written down.
Confidentiality protects the clinical record and all that the doctor learns in the consulting room. It yields where the patient consents to disclosure, where the law compels it — a court order, statutory notification, the reporting duties of the medico-legal cases — or where the public interest clearly demands it, for example warning an identifiable person at risk. Disclosure to an employer, an insurer or a relative is not public interest; it requires the patient's consent.
Common mistakes
Watch outTreating a signed form as consent. The form records a conversation; without an explanation of nature, risks and alternatives, the signature proves only that a pen moved.
Watch outAssuming every bad outcome is negligence, and settling or apologising accordingly. Outcome is not the test: breach of the standard of care, causation and damage are the elements, and a disease that kills despite perfect care is not a payable claim.
Watch outRecording a criminal conviction's absence as the end of the matter. A doctor acquitted in a criminal trial may still face a consumer claim and a disciplinary proceeding on the same facts, because each forum applies a different standard of proof.
Check your understanding
Why is blanket consent rejected by the courts, and what does valid consent require instead?
Distinguish an error of judgment from negligence, with an example of each.
A doctor decides against operating and the patient dies. What must the record show for the decision to be defensible?
Multiple choice
Which of these is a valid consent?
The standard of care against which a doctor's conduct is measured is which of the following?
Which of these situations makes res ipsa loquitur applicable?
A surgeon is acquitted in a criminal trial for causing death by negligence. What is the position?
Which statement about medical records is correct?
Summary and next
Consent is informed, capacity-based, procedure-specific and recorded; blanket consents are rejected, emergencies are narrow, and capacity is assessed per decision. Negligence requires duty, breach of the Bolam standard, causation and damage, distinguished from an honest error of judgment, and it is answered in three fora — civil compensation, criminal liability under section 106 BNS for negligent death, and professional discipline — each with its own standard of proof. Records and confidentiality complete the structure: write contemporaneously, disclose only on consent, compulsion or a demonstrable public interest.
Next: general toxicology — the principles that apply to every poisoned patient: toxicokinetics, dose-response, decontamination, enhanced elimination and the antidotes that matter.